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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the biggest complaints about international trade agree-
ments is that they are negotiated behind closed doors by govern-
ments, whether on a global level through the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), regional level like the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), and 
Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP), or a simple bi-
lateral trade agreement between two countries.1 States are the only 
true actors in trade negotiation and have historically defended se-
crecy around negotiations on the grounds of “national interest and 
commercial confidentiality.”2 Critics of neoliberal free-trade theory 
argue that what actually occurs is that transnational corporations 
have the opportunity to advocate for regulatory structures that ben-
efit their investment and trade strategies at the expense of consum-
ers.3 
Legislators and politicians around the world are routinely criti-
cized for focusing on the needs of wealthy corporate donors instead 
of truly acting in the best interests of their constituents.4 The truth is 
many countries are navigating through a tangled web of treaties, 
agreements, and national laws, in the face of competing interests and 
obligations to constituents. Currently, one of the most contested is-
sues is that of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a dispute 
mechanism in international treaties, and the belief that it allows a 
private actor to interfere with a nation’s ability to set public policy.5 
Increased attention to the issue has some experts and members of 
the public alike arguing that investment chapters in trade agreements 
undermine the rule of law, water down environmental and health 
policies, and expose taxpayers to liability.6 
This article will review ISDS provisions and explore possibili-
ties on how ISDS enforcement mechanisms in trade agreements and 
 1 Patricia Ranald, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Reaching be-
hind the border, challenging democracy, 26(2) ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 241, 242 
(2015). 
2 Id. at 244. 
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investment treaties can be improved upon. Part II considers the his-
tory of free trade agreements and explores the ISDS mechanism, its 
history, and its increasing presence and use. Part III surveys the legal 
landscape through case studies under three different types of agree-
ments, specifically NAFTA, the International Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) and a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). Part IV ex-
plores the implications ISDS cases have on the future of other BITs 
or bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements in the face of pub-
lic mobilization and protectionist movements. Part V prescribes im-
provements to ISDS passages of agreements to maximize the bene-
fits of the mechanism while avoiding its controversial pitfalls. 
II. HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE FREE-TRADE REVOLUTION
To trade is to be human. In fact, trade has been central to human 
life since the Paleolithic era, nearly 150,000 years ago.7 The mech-
anisms for trade have evolved considerably over the millennia, from 
the old trade caravans, to mercantilism, to international free trade, 
and now to the modern era of free trade agreements and investment 
treaties.8 Despite the evolution of trading methods and instruments, 
power has always been a central facet of trade.9 Likewise, discus-
sions about trade and investment agreements today tend to revolve 
around power dynamics more so than goods and services. In fact, 
because tariffs at present are generally lower than they have been in 
recent history,10 the focus of discussions on the modern trade agree-
ment is typically on “nontariff barriers.” The current model of free 
trade agreements is a very modern, recent instrument of interna-
tional law and trade, with the first agreements emerging after the 
Second World War.11 
 7 See generally, William J. Bernstein, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE
SHAPED THE WORLD, (2008). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
 10 Tarriffs: more bindings and closer to zero, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm (last visited 
March 9, 2018). 
 11 The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited 
March 9, 2018). 
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A. GATT and Globalization 
A new era of trade agreements to regulate the international po-
litical economy began with the Bretton Woods Agreement, signed 
in 1944 after the Second World War by forty-four Allied nations.12 
The agreement was the first of its kind and intended to break down 
international trade barriers by designing an international financial 
system.13 In 1947, twenty-three countries organized an initial agree-
ment to liberalize trade amongst them, through the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).14 That same year, the United 
Nations held a Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, 
Cuba where the number of signatories increased to fifty-six and be-
gan negotiations for a charter of a proposed International Trade Or-
ganization.15 
After months of negotiations to draft a charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization, a number of countries refused to ratify 
the charter—effectively killing the possibility of a Trade Organiza-
tion.16 However, GATT was still in force and had reached a signifi-
cant number of signatories, forever changing the international trade 
model despite being a “provisional agreement.”17 For nearly fifty 
years, GATT provided the legal framework and guiding principles 
of international trade as an ever-increasing number of countries con-
tinued to sign onto the agreement, and to meet for “trade rounds” 
where signatories negotiated trade liberalization and tariff reduction 
amendments.18 
 12 See Robert E. Asher and Edward S. Mason, THE WORLD BANK SINCE
BRETTON WOODS 1 (1973). 
13 The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 12. 
 14 Press Release, European Office, Geneva, Second Session of the Prepara-
tory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment - 
Adoption and Signature of the Final Act, U.N, Press Release/469 (Oct. 27, 1947) 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/PRESSRELEASE/469.pdf. 
15 U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/8 (No-
vember 7, 1947), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/ECONF2/8.PDF; U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. 
Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (March 24, 1948), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q
/UN/ECONF2/78.PDF 
16 The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 12. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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Initially, GATT provisions centered solely on tariff reduction; 
however, the later provisions began to include anti-dumping provi-
sions, and ultimately included non-tariff and systemic trade barri-
ers.19 Eventually, the “Uruguay Round” (or the negotiations be-
tween 1986-94) led to an extensive number of new agreements and 
the establishment of the WTO.20 The world was changing rapidly 
and the initial provisions were struggling to keep pace with changes 
such as a globalized service industry, increased international invest-
ment, financial services, intellectual property protections, interna-
tional telecommunications and information technology, changes in 
agricultural trade, and the increased use of dispute settlement mech-
anisms.21 The WTO became the formal organization for signatories 
to GATT— the legal principles of which serve as the umbrella treaty 
for the organization.22 
B. Origins and Purpose of Investor State Settlement 
Conceived of in the 1950s and first seen in a treaty in 1969, the 
modern ISDS system was intended to foster investments in devel-
oping nations and provide protection for business investors who 
wanted to invest in those nations.23 ISDS was designed to protect 
businesses from biased state powers and provide a neutral platform 
for arbitration.24 It was an efficient, apolitical, dispute system tem-
porarily formed outside the jurisdiction of any national courts or in-
ternational bodies.25 The mechanism allowed companies to weather 
political instability and avoid expropriation of assets while allowing 
poor, unstable nations to benefit from investments such as roads, 
telecommunications, or fuel.26 An investor could confidently invest 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm. 
22 Id.; The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 12. 
 23 Fact Sheet: Investor Dispute Settlement (ISDS), United States Office of the 
Trade Representative, 2015, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-of-
fice/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds [hereinafter 
Fact Sheet]; HALEY SWEETLAND EDWARDS, SHADOW COURTS: THE TRIBUNALS 
THAT RULE GLOBAL TRADE 13-14 (2016). 
24 EDWARDS, supra note 24 at 13-14. 
25 Id. 
26 Id, 
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in an emerging economy knowing that if her assets such as oil fields, 
factories, or plantations were expropriated by a foreign government, 
she would be able to file a claim directly against that country without 
worrying about its biased or corrupt court system.27 
ISDS is binding arbitration in the international arena, designed 
to settle disputes between countries and foreign investors that do 
business within their borders.28 Details vary but the mechanism is 
essentially the same.29 Foreign companies sue a state in front of a 
tribunal, typically of three arbitrators, usually private attorneys, for-
mer government officials, international jurists or trade experts.30 
The business and the state each choose one of the arbitrators and 
usually decide on the third together.31 Most ISDS proceedings are 
resolved under the rules of the Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the 
ICSID Convention).32 After the tribunal or arbitral panel makes a 
decision on the dispute using those or other previously agreed upon 
arbitral rules, the decisions are enforced under the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 1958 Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards,33 
known as the New York Convention.34 
C. A growing chorus of ISDS claims and concerns 
The number of ISDS claims has grown nearly exponentially 35 
and in ways that raise concerns from scholars and trade experts 
27 Id. 




32 About ICSID, WORLD BANK GROUP INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
en/Pages/about/default.aspx (last visited May 5, 2018). 
 33 Process Overview, WORLD BANK GROUP INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Overview.aspx (last visited May 5, 2018). 
 34 See generally N.Y. Arbitration Convention, www.newyorkconven-
tion.com 
 35 Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, U.N. UNCTAD, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByYear (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
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around the globe and across the political spectrum.36 From the 1980s 
to 2015, the number of ISDS claims grew along with the number of 
trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties, from a few hun-
dred to nearly 3,000 ISDS agreements.37 In 2015, the highest num-
bers of ISDS claims were filed in a single year to date, a total of 74 
individual claims.38 There have been at least 696 ISDS claims since 
the mechanism’s inception, the majority of which are from the last 
twenty years.39 These claims have not been evenly distributed; Ar-
gentina is the number one respondent in ISDS Claims with 59 claims 
against its government, and the United States is the number one 
home country of claimants, with United States corporations bringing 
148 claims over the years.40 
While the increased number of arbitral awards levied against de-
veloping nations has experts questioning whether this encourages 
development outcomes in those countries, others worry about a slip-
pery slope towards the total erosion of state sovereignty.41 There is 
 36 See e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 24 at 24;GUS VAN HARTEN, CANADA’S 
LOPSIDED INVESTMENT DEAL WITH CHINA, (2015) ; “The Arbitration Game,” THE 
ECONOMIST, (October 11, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-inves-
tors-arbitration; Dan Ikenson, “Eight Reasons To Purge Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement from Trade Agreements” Blog, FORBES, (March 4, 2014, 4:18 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2014/03/04/eight-reasons-to-purge-in-
vestor-state-dispute-settlement-from-trade-agreements/#69639a001899; Terra 
Lawson-Remer, “The Obscure Trade Provision Everyone is Talking About” The 
Blog, HUFFINGTON POST, (May 16, 2014 10:38 am), https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/terra-lawsonremer/the-obscure-trade-provisi_b_7297342.html; 
Chris Hamby, “Secrets of a Global Super Court: Part 1 The Court that Rules the 
World” BUZZFEED NEWS, (August 28, 2016,) 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/super-
court?utm_term=.guGXd3wLA#.ti4kJ8NBm; Gary Clyde Haufbauer, “ISDS is 
the Baby, Not the Bathwater,” Opinions, WALL STREET J., (April 18, 2018 3:46 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/isds-procedure-is-the-baby-not-bath-water-
1524080774 
 37 See generally International Investment Agreement Navigator, U.N. 
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
 38 Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, U.N. UNCTAD, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByYear (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See e.g., Robert Gebeloff, “Are multinational corporations undermining 
freedom in poor countries?” WASHINGTON POST, (September 13, 2016), 
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a growing concern that the increase in ISDS claims is a sign of in-
vestors abusing the mechanism and challenging legitimate regula-
tions.42 In a United States Supreme Court decision that enforced an 
arbitration award against Argentina in 2014, Chief Justice Roberts 
penned a dissent finding this award objectionable.43 In his dissent he 
questions the power given to private arbitrators over sovereign states 
and writes: 
. . . by acquiescing to arbitration, a state permits pri-
vate adjudicators to review its public policies and ef-
fectively annul the authoritative acts of its legisla-
ture, executive, and judiciary . . .  Given these stakes, 
one would expect the United Kingdom and Argen-
tina to have taken particular care in specifying the 
limited circumstances in which foreign investors can 
trigger the Treaty’s arbitration process.44 
Opponents of ISDS argue that the dramatic rise in the number of 
ISDS claims is indicative of abuse and that the lack of transparency 
lends to inconsistent results.45 Originally intended to protect invest-
ments in countries with “corrupt or rickety rule of law,” ISDS claims 
are now brought against countries with strong economies such as the 
United States, Germany, and Australia.46 Investors now routinely 
challenge host governments’ laws and regulations that cut into prof-
its because of an increased number of awards for expropriation of 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/09/13/are-multina-
tional-corporations-undermining-freedom-in-poor-coun-
tries/?utm_term=.53b981eb91c5; Armand De Mestral, “The Impact of Investor-
State Arbitration on Developing Countries,” CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, (November 22, 2017), https://www.ci-
gionline.org/articles/impact-investor-state-arbitration-developing-countries; 
Chris Hamby, “Secrets of a Global Super Court: Part 2 The Billion Dollar Ulti-
matum,” BUZZFEED NEWS, (August 30, 2016 6:00 a.m.), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/the-billion-dollar-ultima-
tum?utm_term=.ptLDbVL5z#.rtzveJ5O8 
42 Fact Sheet supra note 24. 
 43 BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1215 (2014) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. 
45 EDWARDS, supra note 24, at 14. 
46 EDWARDS, supra note 24, at 15-16. 
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future profits.47 Corporations with a multinational presence have 
grown more wealthy and powerful than many nations in this ex-
tremely globalized era, calling into question whether the ISDS 
mechanism still works under this inverted power dynamic.48 Critics 
complain that if the corporations are now more powerful than sov-
ereign states, protecting corporate profits from a less powerful 
state’s various public policy decisions cannot be just.49 
The once infrequent role of third party investors has grown to 
carve a new industry out from the existing arbitration boom.50 Tra-
ditionally, third party investors would provide access to justice to 
parties that may not have had other means of funding arbitration, by 
funding the up-front costs of arbitration in return for a percentage of 
the award.51 Now, third party investors, essentially monitor govern-
ments for broad national policies, laws, and regulations that may cut 
into corporate profits.52  Once a proposed law has been identified, 
these investors find and fund companies who are likely to succeed 
in the complaint and take a percentage of the arbitral award.53  Sim-
ilarly, corporations are also criticized for ‘back-end treaty shop-
ping,’ a term analogous to ‘forum shopping,’ where, in United States 
civil procedure, litigants ‘shop’ for the jurisdiction with the laws 
most favorable to their claims and then file a complaint where they 
expect to have the most favorable outcome.54 This more objection-
able form of treaty shopping is characterized by a corporation re-
structuring investments either after a dispute has arisen or as soon 
as a dispute becomes foreseeable, as a method of gaining access to 
an ISDS agreement more favorable to that dispute.55 
47 Id. at 15. 
48 See Hamby, supra note 37. 
49 Id. 
50 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Investor State Dis-
pute Settlement Public Consultation, 16 May- July 2012, OECD, 36-42 (2012); 
CHRISTIAN HEDERER, Third-Party Funding in International Investment Arbitra-
tion Analysis and Regulatory Options, University of Ottawa Working Paper, 
Technical University of Applied Sciences Wildau Dec 2016. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2952488 
51 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs supra note 51. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 John Lee, Resolving Concerns of Treaty Shopping in International Invest-
ment Arbitration, 6(2) J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 355, 358 (2016). 
55 Id. 
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To make matters more complex, the dearth of ISDS decisions 
available before the late 1990s made for an incomplete body of ju-
risprudence, making it difficult to predict the result of arbitral pro-
ceedings.56 Decisions are only binding upon the parties involved in 
the dispute, with no system of appeal, and arbitrators have reached 
dramatically different results on nearly identical facts.57 Opponents 
blame the private or secret nature of the proceedings for the lack of 
jurisprudence.58 Details of proceedings tend to remain confidential 
unless both parties choose to publish them.59 The ICSID Tribunal 
typically provides on its website lists of disputes and awards, but not 
the submissions of the parties or details of the proceedings.60 
UNCITRAL did not publish details of any proceedings until 2014,
61 although there are some awards available through subscription 
services and on some institutional websites.62 Critics also blame am-
biguous language and loopholes for the amount of unpredictability 
in arbitral decisions. 63 
III. INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SECTIONS, EXAMINED.
There is an increasingly large body of academic study criticizing 
ISDS and its effects on sovereign governments to pursue legitimate 
public policy objectives.64 This type of analysis tends to focus on 
the end results and effects of arbitral awards and decision on public 
policy, but there is a greater value in looking more closely at the way 
the unique facts of a controversy applied to the language of a treaty 
or agreement affect its outcomes. While many arbitral documents 
56 Ranald, supra note 1, at 248. 
57 Id. at 249. 
58 Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: 
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 
VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 70 (2011) 




63 Schill, supra note 59 at 70; Susan D. Franck and Lindsey E. Wylie, Pre-
dicting Outcomes In Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 463-7 
(2015). 
64 Id. 
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are confidential, or difficult to access, there is enough public infor-
mation to closely explore how the ISDS mechanism functions under 
different circumstances and agreements. 
The three ISDS disputes explored below, each initiated under a 
different trade agreement, provide three case studies to examine 
ISDS mechanisms in action as well as the tensions between national 
policy and foreign investments. These disputes where chosen be-
cause the triggering actions of the host state in each claim involved 
public policy with either broad domestic support or a clearly stated 
public policy objective. First, an examination of the Keystone XL 
controversy against the United States, and which is currently on 
hold. Second, an examination of the Vattenfall controversies against 
Germany, partially settled through an opaque deliberation process. 
And last, the Philip Morris controversy against Uruguay, which was 
settled through a relatively transparent deliberation process and pro-
vides insight into what happens during an ISDS procedure. 
A. NAFTA and the Keystone Controversy 
A significant amount of academic criticism has been based on 
cases that arose under the NAFTA ISDS provisions, with United 
States corporations being awarded decisions against Canada and 
Mexico.65 The Keystone XL Controversy is slightly different in that 
it has caught the public eye and moved the discussion out of aca-
demia. 
In 2015, after attracting significant negative attention from en-
vironmental activists, the Keystone XL oil pipeline, proposed by 
Canadian petroleum company TransCanada, was rejected by United 
 65 See e.g., Mark Green, “Keep NAFTA’s ISDS Protections for US Investors”, 
ENERGY TOMORROW BLOG, (October 10, 2017), http://energytomor-
row.org/blog/2017/10/10/keep-naftas-isds-protections-for-us-investors; Geoffrey 
Gertz, “Renegotiating NAFTA: Options for Investment Protection” Global Views, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (March 7, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/03/global-20170315-nafta.pdf 
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States President Obama66 and became the modern symbol of envi-
ronmental victory against climate change and fossil fuel use.67  In 
addition to considerable public protest both against the pipeline and 
against its denial, President Obama’s official statement rejecting the 
pipeline68 sparked a debate amongst economic and legal scholars 
centered on executive authority, the way trade agreements are 
drafted, the enforcement mechanisms within them, and the overall 
implications for citizens; natural and corporate persons alike.69 In a 
controversial move, on January 24th, 2017, President Donald Trump 
issued a Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of 
the Keystone Pipeline XL, effectively reversing President 
Barack Obama’s equally controversial executive order that 
prohibited con-struction and operation of cross border facilities 
for the Keystone XL Pipeline.70 
Prior to Donald Trump’s Presidential Memorandum on January 
24, 2017, TransCanada was seeking at least $15 billion in damages 
from the United States for allegedly violating its obligations under 
 66 Press Release, White House, Statement by the President on the Keystone 
XL Pipeline (Nov. 6, 2015) (on file with the White House President Barrack 
Obama archive); Bill Chappell, President Obama Rejects Keystone XL Pipeline 
Plan, NPR (Nov. 6, 2015 11:39AM ET), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/11/06/455007054/president-obama-expected-to-reject-keystone-xl-
plan-friday. 
67 Keystone XL-Victory, 350.ORG , https://350.org/kxl-victory/. 
 68 Coral Davenport, “Citing Climate Change, Obama Rejects Construction of 
Keystone XL Oil Pipeline,” N.Y., (November 6, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/11/07/us/obama-expected-to-reject-construction-of-keystone-
xl-oil-pipeline.html. 
69 See e.g., Dillon Fowler, Keystonewalled: TransCanada’s Discrimination 
Claim Under NAFTA and the Future of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 31 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 103 (2016); Jeffrey Kleeger, The Privatization Of Law & The 
Weakening Of Private Right, 6 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 55 (2016); Laurence E. 
Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional Reappraisal 
of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J. F. 86, 91-95 (2016). 
 70 Memorandum from the President on the Construction of the Keystone XL 
Pipeline (Jan. 24, 2017) (on file with the White House). 
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Chapter 11 of NAFTA. 71 It sought relief in both United States 
federal court and through ISDS.72 Like most modern trade 
agreements, NAFTA does not interfere with a government’s 
sovereign right to impose environmental regulations as long as the 
regulations are not discriminatory against foreign corporations and 
investors.73 
i. NAFTA
Even when first proposed in 1990, NAFTA was controversial— 
primarily because it was the first free trade agreement involving two 
wealthy, developed countries and a developing country.74 Coming 
into force in 1994, NAFTA ultimately served as a template for cer-
tain provisions in multilateral trade negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round.75 At the time, NAFTA was the most comprehensive free 
trade agreement ever negotiated, contained several groundbreaking 
provisions, and served as the model for other free trade agreements 
the United States later negotiated.76 NAFTA created a trilateral trade 
bloc in North America between the United States, Canada, and Mex-
ico.77 NAFTA was the first major regional trade agreement that re-
quired a supplementary environmental cooperation agreement for 
passage.78 It has two supplemental components, North American 
 71 See North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)[hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 72 Complaint, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline LLP v Kerry, et al., No 4:16-
cv-00036, S.D. Tex, (2016) [hereinafter TransCanada Complaint]; TransCanada 
Corporation & TransCanada PipeLines Limited v. The United States of America, 
Notice Of Intent To Submit A Claim To Arbitration Under Chapter 11 Of The 
North American Free Trade Agreement, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, January 6, 
2016, [hereinafter Notice of Intent]; TransCanada Corporation & TransCanada 
PipeLines Limited v. The Government of the United States of America, Request 
for Arbitration, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, June 24, 2016 [hereinafter Request 
for Arbitration] 
73 GATT at Article 2.2; NAFTA at Article 1106 (6). 
 74 See, Stephen W Hartman, NAFTA, the Controversy, 25 INT’L TRADE J. 1, 
3 (2010). 
75 ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSONM CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42965 THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 2 (2017). 
76 Id. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 9-10. 
2018] IS PUBLIC POLICY UNDERMINED BY INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE 
MECHANISMS 145
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).79 
While political debate continues regarding the domestic 
benefits of trade-liberalization and signing onto NAFTA,80 most 
economic research suggests NAFTA has provided a net benefit 
for all three signatories.81 As of 2015, the United States’ trade 
with its NAFTA partners has more than tripled since the 
agreement took effect—in-creasing more rapidly than trade with 
the rest of the world.82 
Petroleum products specifically are a central component of 
United States trade with both Canada and Mexico, making up ap-
proximately 16% of total trade.83 In 2014, Canada and Mexico ac-
counted for 46% ($110.9 billion) of total United States crude oil im-
ports ($241.8 billion).84 Canada is the leading supplier of crude pe-
troleum oil to the United States, followed by Saudi Arabia and Mex-
ico.85 NAFTA’s extensive energy provisions have facilitated this en-
ergy and petroleum trade between the United States and Canada, and 
underscores the importance of petroleum trade by stating: “It is de-
sirable to strengthen the important role that trade in energy and basic 
petrochemical goods plays in the free trade area . . . .”86 By virtue of 
NAFTA and the private sector orientation of the energy sectors in 
both countries, American and Canadian companies effectively com-
prise a single integrated market for petroleum and are integrated in 
production, transport, and refining infrastructure.87 Article 605 of 
79 Id. 
 80 See, Robert Bowman, A Growing Hostility To Free Trade Has Put NAFTA 
On Life Support, FORBES (July 2, 2014 2:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbowman/2014/07/02/a-growing-hostility-to-
free-trade-has-put-nafta-on-life-support/#3c6227de3dfc. 
81 See Lorenzo Caliendo & Fernando Parro, Estimates of the Trade and Wel-
fare Effects of NAFTA, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 1 (2014); see Mary E. Burfisher, 
et al., The Impact of NAFTA on the United States, 15 J. ECON. OF PERSP. 125, 125-
26 (2001). 
 82 M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42965, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 11 (2015). 
83 Id.at 12. 
84 Id. at 14. 
85 Id. at 12-13. 
86 NAFTA, supra note 72, at art. 601.2. 
87 PAUL W. PARFORMAK & MICHAEL RATNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41875, THE U.S.- CANADA RELATIONSHIP: JOINED AT THE WELL 12 (2011). 
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NAFTA places restrictions on the ability of the United States to limit 
exports of energy and petro-chemical goods to Canada and vice 
versa (Mexico is not party to Article 605).88 Both GATT and 
NAFTA contain national security exceptions, though NAFTA limits 
the scope of the exceptions for the United States and Canada in en-
ergy trade.89 
ii. The Keystone XL Controversy
In 2008, TransCanada sought to expand its existing pipeline to 
transport Canadian tar sands (or oil sands) crude to a market hub in 
Nebraska, where it would be processed for further transport to the 
Gulf Coast region refineries.90 After announcing its plans, the com-
pany applied for a cross-border presidential permit with the United 
States Department of State (DOS).91 Opposition to Keystone XL be-
gan to mount in the United States.92 First, TransCanada ran into 
routing issues in Nebraska.93 Then legislators began calling 
for greater environmental oversight,94 scientists began speaking 
out against the project,95 and the EPA questioned the necessity 
of the 
88 NAFTA, supra note 72, at art. 605. 
89 Id. 
90 Press Release, TransCanada, Keystone Pipeline to Expand to Serve the 
U.S. Gulf Coast, July 16, 2008, (archived at https://www.transcanada.com/en/an-
nouncements/2008-07-16keystone-pipeline-to-expand-to-serve-the-u.s.-gulf-
coast/); Keystone XL 101 Route Maps, available at http://www.keystone-
xl.com/kxl-101/maps/ 
 91 Keystone XL Timeline, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.ener-
gyxxi.org/keystone-xl-timeline (last visited March 2, 2017). 
 92 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Thousands protest at the White House against Key-
stone XL pipeline,” GUARDIAN, November 6, 2011 
 93 Kim Murphy, “Keystone pipeline builder proposes changing Nebraska 
route,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 15 2011. 
 94 Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from Senators Bernard Sanders, 
Patrick Leahy, and Ron Wyden, October 17, 2011, archived at 
https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/Waterfall/193727.pdf 
 95 Letter from Scientific Experts to President Obama Regarding Authoriza-
tion of the Keystone XL Pipeline, August 3 2011, text available at https://cli-
matechangepsychology.blogspot.com/2011/08/letter-from-scientific-experts-
to.html; Letter to Congressional Leadership from Concerned Scientists, February 
13, 2012, text available at https://350.org/top-climate-scientists-warn-congress-
over-keystone-xl/ 
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pipeline in its Environmental Impact Statement.96 Extensive protests 
began, resulting in the arrest of approximately a thousand people 
over a few weeks,97 including celebrities.98 After delays, the House 
passed H.R 1938, or The North American- Made Energy Security 
Act, among others, which required a decision be made within sixty 
days. 99 In 2011, the State department concluded that the Keystone 
XL pipeline would have no significant impacts as proposed.100 En-
vironmental protesters had decried the pipeline for traversing Ne-
braska’s Ogallala Aquifer, a source of drinking water to millions on 
the Great Plains.101 By 2012, President Obama rejected the Trans-
Canada permit application.102 
Afterwards, TransCanada submitted a second request for a per-
mit from DOS.103In 2013, President Obama said that he would only 
reject the pipeline if it did not significantly exacerbate climate 
 96 EPA Comments in response to Keystone XL Supplemental Draft EIS, June 
6, 2011, available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/06/07/docu-
ment_gw_02.pdf 
 97 Sarah Wheaton, “ Hundreds Face Arrest at Anti-Pipeline Protest,” Caucus 
Blog, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2014 (“The Keystone XL pipeline has become a 
touchstone for the environmental movement, and civil disobedience has been a 
key tactic: 1,200 were arrested at the White House over two weeks in the fall of 
2011, and smaller-scale actions have taken place around the country.”) 




 99 NORTH AMERICAN-MADE ENERGY SECURITY ACT, H.R REP. 112-140, at 3 
(2011). See Adam Vann et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42124, Proposed Key-
stone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 4 (2012) at 3 (“The North American Energy Se-
curity Act (S. 1932), the American Energy Security Act (H.R. 3537), and the Mid-
dle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 (H.R. 3630) also would require 
the Secretary of State to issue a permit for the project within 60 days of enactment, 
unless the President publicly determines the project to be not in the national inter-
est.”) 
 100 See U.S. Dep’t. of State, Final Environmental Impact Statement Keystone 
XL Project, vol.2 section 3.15 (Aug. 26, 2011). 
 101 The Canadian Press Staff, A timeline of important dates in Keystone XL 
pipeline history, GLOBAL NEWS CAN., (Jan. 7, 2016) http://global-
news.ca/news/2438078/a-timeline-of-important-dates-in-keystone-xl-pipeline-
history/ [hereinafter Timeline]. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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change.104 The following year, the Department of State released its 
final environmental impact statement that reiterated that pipeline 
would not significantly exacerbate climate change.105 However, a 
Nebraska district judge declared the pipeline’s route was unconsti-
tutional, triggering DOS to extend interagency review of this pipe-
line because of the ongoing litigation regarding the pipeline in Ne-
braska.106 By early 2015, the House and the Senate had agreed upon 
a bill that would allow the Keystone pipeline to be built, with most 
commentary in favor of its construction focused around creating 
jobs and strengthening the economy.107 President Obama vetoed the 
bill and Congress failed to override the veto.108 
TransCanada requested that DOS suspend review while litiga-
tion continued in Nebraska.109 Meanwhile, President Obama faced 
pressure from the public and from Congressional Representatives to 
officially reject TransCanada’s Keystone XL pipeline application 
before the UN Convention on Climate Change on Nov 30, 2015.110 
On November 3, 2015 the Department of State officially rejected the 
permit,111 and on November 6, 2015, President Obama announced 
the rejection in a press conference.112 The main argument for rejec-
tion was that would set the tone for the United States’ seriousness 
about climate change.113 
TransCanada Corp. pursued legal action against President 
Obama’s rejection of the Keystone XL Pipeline in two forums.114 
The suit was in United States federal court, in the Southern District 
 104 Remarks by the President on Climate Change, Georgetown University, 
Jun. 25, 2013 (on file with the White House President Barack Obama Archive) at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-
president-climate-change) 





110 See Timeline supra note 102. 
111 U.S. Dep’t of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determina-
tion, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. Application for Presidential Permit, 
section 7.0 (Nov. 3, 2015), https://2012-keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/249450.pdf [hereinafter Record of Decision] 
112 Press Release, supra note 67. 
113 See generally Record of Decision, supra note 112. 
114 See Timeline supra note 102. 
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of Texas, and accused President Obama of “exceed[ing] his author-
ity . . . when he blocked the pipeline’s construction.”115 The United 
States Chamber of Commerce, Oklahoma, Kansas, Montana, Ne-
braska, South Dakota, and Texas filed briefs supporting TransCan-
ada’s lawsuit against the Obama administration—a sure sign of 
competing national interests.116 The second suit was an international 
petition seeking to recover $15 billion in costs and damages that 
TransCanada incurred in relation to the Keystone XL Pipeline denial 
through ISDS. 117 
By filing its two complaints, TransCanada added fuel to a grow-
ing resistance against free-trade agreements, and amplified the cho-
rus of misgivings about the investment-arbitration and environmen-
tal provisions in the then proposed TPP.118 Critics viewed Trans-
Canada’s NAFTA claims against the United States as a canary in the 
coal-mine, raising concerns on three major issues.119 First, concerns 
regarding the effect that investor state dispute settlements may have 
on the United States’ ability to implement environmental protection 
policies and exercise its sovereignty.120 Second, the mounting ob-
jections regarding the lack of transparency in arbitral tribunals.121 
And third, that this was another alarming example of international 
115 Complaint supra note 73, 
 116 Amicus Brief, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline LLP v Kerry, et al., No 
4:16-cv-00036, S.D. Tex, (2016) (available at http://www.chamberlitiga-
tion.com/cases/transcanada-keystone-pipeline-lp-v-kerry-et-al); 
117 Notice Of Intent supra note 73; Request for Arbitration, supra note 73. 
118 See Ben Beachy, “The Corporation behind Keystone XL Just laid bare the 
TPP’s Threats to Our Climate” SIERRA CLUB, (January 7, 2016), https://www.si-
erraclub.org/compass/2016/01/corporation-behind-keystone-xl-just-laid-bare-
tpp-s-threats-our-climate; Jefferey Sachs, Brook Güven, and Lisa Sachs, “Op Ed: 
TransCanada lawsuit highlights need to scuttle TPP” MSNBC, (July 16, 2016), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/07/MSNBC-TransCanada-lawsuit-
highlights-need-to-scuttle-TPP-July-2016.pdf 
119 Sachs supra 119. 
 120 Beachy supra 119 (“It is part of a rising trend of fossil fuel corporations 
using trade and investment deals to attack environmental victories in private tri-
bunals.”); Sachs supra 119; Statement of Caroll Muffett on TransCanada Lawsuit 
Using the Investment Chapter of NAFTA, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVTL.
L. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.ciel.org/news/8886/. 
121 EDWARDS supra note 24 at 13 
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law appearing to prioritize corporate dominance over public pol-
icy.122 
iii. Analysis of Keystone XL under NAFTA
The primary dispute mechanisms in NAFTA can be found under 
Chapters 11, 19, and 20.123 Of particular importance in the Keystone 
XL debate are Chapter 11 and Chapter 20. The language in Chapter 
11 establishes the ISDS mechanism, allowing investors to seek re-
course against the offending host government through ICSID or 
UNCITRAL rules, with enforcement from the host government’s 
domestic courts.124 Chapter 20 provides for scientific review boards 
that can be called on by the arbitration panel in consultation with the 
aggrieved party to provide reports on any factual issues related to 
environmental, health or other scientific categorizations.125 
Like most other investment treaties, NAFTA commits its host 
governments to a Fair and Equitable Treatment, or FET standard, 
meaning that host governments must extend fair and equitable treat-
ment to investors of other states.126 In other arbitral settings, states 
have been found in violation of FET agreements for failing to be 
transparent in administrative decision-making, or in inconsistent ac-
tions of state agencies towards the investor such as encouragement 
and approval from one agency and denial of permits from another.127 
Violations based on administrative inconsistencies speak to the con-
cept of the “legitimate expectations of the investor,” which protects 
the rights of investors to make decisions based on an expectation of 
 122 Statement of Caroll Muffett, supra 121.(“With a single press release, 
TransCanada has proven what concerned citizens have argued for decades – that 
the primary purpose of ISDS is to subvert democratic processes and the public 
interest, in the name of private profit.”); Haley Sweetland Edwards, “Keystone 
Pipeline Challenged in Shadowy ‘Court’” TIME, January 7, 2016 
123 See generally, NAFTA supra note 72. 
124 Id. at Chap. 11. 
125 Id. at Chap. 20. 
126 Id. at Chap. 11, art. 1105. 
127 See e.g., Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID case No 
ARB/AF/97/1, Tribunal Decision August 30, 2000. (The Tribunal found that be-
cause there was no clear rule concerning construction permits requirements in 
Mexico, had “failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for 
Metalclad’s planning and 
investment”( ¶ 99)) 
2018] IS PUBLIC POLICY UNDERMINED BY INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE 
MECHANISMS 151
consistent actions from its host government—a key concept under-
lying ISDS and protecting Foreign Direct Investments.128 
In its Notice of Intent to pursue arbitration, TransCanada claims 
that the United States breached its obligations under Articles 1102, 
1103, 1105, and 1110 of NAFTA subsequently causing damages to 
TransCanada.129 It argued that the United States unjustifiably de-
layed processing of the permit, unjustifiably denied the permit, and 
unjustly discriminated against the pipeline.130 
Article 1110 establishes the possibility of indirect expropriation, 
by prohibiting state actions that are “tantamount to expropriation.” 
The text reads as follows: 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or
expropriate an investment of an investor of another 
Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an invest-
ment (“expropriation”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Ar-
ticle 1105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance 
with paragraphs 2 through 6.131 
This language is ambiguous and when interpreted narrowly or 
broadly either interpretation will lead to different results. However, 
in this situation the facts indicate a likely resolution in favor of 
TransCanada under both interpretations. 
TransCanada’s permit was denied for symbolic reasons rather 
than on the basis of scientifically supported negative environmental 
 128 See Elizabeth Snodgrass, Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations – 
Recognizing and 
Delimiting a General Principle, 21 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 11 (2006) 
129 Notice of Intent, supra note 73. 
130 Id. at ¶ 8. 
131 NAFTA, supra note 72, Chap. 11, art. 1110. 
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impacts.132 However, similar projects moved forward.133 While nu-
merous opponents of the Keystone XL Pipeline, including 
members of Congress made statements questioning the national 
benefits a pipeline to assist in the export of Canadian oil via the 
United States ports in the Gulf of Mexico, any argument that this 
discrimination was on the basis of Canadian corporate citizenship 
would be tenuous at best. However, there is no indication in the 
NAFTA text that the discrimination in question must be based 
on investor citizenship. The text merely points to any 
discrimination that exists. Even under a narrow interpretation, the 
fact that Keystone XL was singled out from other pipelines and 
evaluated with an additional element of ‘public perception’ that 
did not ostensibly apply to other pipeline construction does not 
look favorable for the United States govern-ment. 
In regards to the idea that permit denial rises to the “tantamount 
to expropriation” standard in Article 1110,134 TransCanada has 
some weight to its case. For a purpose without any obvious tangible 
results, the permit denial for the Keystone XL pipeline foreclosed 
TransCanada’s ability to benefit from its time spent and billions in 
investments.135 The lack of obvious tangible results supports argu-
ments that the decision was arbitrary, rather than measured, predict-
able, and fair. The United States government would need to make a 
strong case that foreign policy and intangible gains of international 
soft power are a significant public policy benefit. The United States 
could also point to the massive protests to demonstrate that the pipe-
line was a source of civil unrest and that its denial was in the service 
of public interests. However, this reasoning would be stretching the 
definition of public interest. 
 132 Secretary of State John Kerry Press Statement on the Keystone XL Pipeline 
Permit Determination, November 6, 2015 (“The critical factor in my determina-
tion was this: moving forward with this project would significantly undermine our 
ability to continue leading the world in combatting climate change . . . while it 
would facilitate the transportation to the United States of one of the dirtiest 
sources of fuel on the planet, the proposed project by itself is unlikely to signifi-
cantly impact the level of crude extraction or the continued demand for heavy 
crude oil at refineries in the United States.” https://2009-2017.state.gov/secre-
tary/remarks/2015/11/249249.htm 
133 See generally Notice of Intent, supra note 86. 
134 NAFTA, supra note 72, Chap. 11, art. 1110. 
135 Complaint, supra note 73 at ¶ 49. 
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To counter the claim that the decision was unfairly arbitrary the 
United States could rely on the fact that the permit is a 
discretionary rather than ministerial or administrative permit. An 
administrative permit is one in which an agency or governmental 
body must dis-pense the permit once it is determined that the 
applicant has con-formed to whatever applicable statutes, 
ordinances, or regulations require, without any deliberation or 
exercise of judgment. A discre-tionary permit, on the other hand, is 
one in which the agency or gov-ernmental officials who dispense 
the permit must use their discre-tion. This means that when 
analyzing whether or not to award the permit to the applicant, 
there are no circumstances that mandate per-mit issuance. 
Articles 1102, 1103, and 1105 establish the FET standards along 
with Most Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment standards as the mini-
mum standards of treatment.136 Here, TransCanada’s success would 
rely upon an interpretation of the language that does not require that 
the cause of discrimination be its status as a foreign corporation. 
Additionally, this line of argumentation is weakened by the fact that 
United States corporations pursued the other pipelines that were ap-
proved without any fanfare or difficulty.137 Traditionally, one of the 
chief complaints against ISDS is that the mechanism is only availa-
ble to foreign investors and domestic corporations do not have the 
opportunity to challenge their government in an arbitral setting. In 
this case, the fact that neither domestic corporation has access to 
ISDS with the United States could be used to argue that without this 
avenue TransCanada is already receiving treatment more favorable 
to other corporations. While this argument is tenuous and uses the 
complaints against ISDS, it is still a potential defense for the United 
States. 
To date the United States has never lost an arbitration dispute 
under NAFTA,138 however based on a preliminary analysis of the 
facts and the NAFTA text, it is quite possible that this case could 
have been the first loss for the United States. A $15 billion award 
enforced against the United States would be a devastating and ex-
pensive first blow under this mechanism—an expensive bill left for 
136 NAFTA, supra note 72, Chap. 11, arts. 1102-03, 1105. 
137 Complaint supra note 73 at ¶¶25-27. 
138 Mark Green supra note 66. 
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the American taxpayer to a pay for the ability to say it temporarily 
had the appearance of a strong stance on climate change. One can 
only speculate on the final results of this arbitration would have 
been; the United States may have avoided a negative arbitral award 
when the Trump Administration granted TransCanada the presiden-
tial permit for the Keystone XL pipeline, and rendered the issues 
moot.139 
B. International Energy Charter Treaty and the Vattenfall 
Controversy  
Similarly to NAFTA, the International Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) was developed in the early 1990s to facilitate trade, specifi-
cally in the post-cold war European energy sector.140 The formation 
of the WTO and the end of the Cold War provided the opportunity 
to overcome economic divisions between Western European and 
Post-Soviet nations.141 In the 1970s and 1980s, despite pressure 
from the United States,142 Western European countries had begun 
negotiations and construction of a natural gas pipeline from the So-
viet Union. By December 1991 and the end of the Cold War, a po-
litical declaration, the European Energy Charter, announced the gen-
eral principles of an energy trade and investment treaty signatories 
intended to develop.143 What is now known as the ECT was signed 
in 1994, and together with the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and 
 139 Order Regarding Notice Of Granting Of Presidential Permit And Of Vol-
untary Dismissal, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline LLP v Kerry, et al., No 4:16-
cv-00036, S.D. Tex, (2017); Luciana Lopeez, “Trump administration grants per-
mit for Keystone pipeline- TransCanada”, Reuters, March 24, 2017 8:55 AM 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-pipeline-keystone/trump-administration-
grants-permit-for-keystone-xl-pipeline-transcanada-idINKBN16V1L0 
 140 The Energy Charter Process, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.ener-
gycharter.org/process/overview/. 
141 Id. 
 142 See Paul Lewis, U.S. Asks Its Allies To Deny To Soviet Parts for Pipeline, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/11/world/us-asks-
its-allies-to-deny-to-soviet-parts-for-pipeline.html); See generally JOHN HARDT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV; DONNA L. GOLD, IB82020 CONG. RESEARCH SERV; 
SOVIET GAS PIPELINE: U.S. OPTIONS (1982). (accessible at https://digital.li-
brary.unt.edu/ark:/67531/meta-
crs8790/m1/1/high_res_d/IB82020_1982Oct08.pdf). 
143 The Energy Charter Process, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.ener-
gycharter.org/process/overview/. 
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Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA), created the framework 
that facilitated an integrated energy sector.144 
The ECT expanded the foundational trade rules of GATT and 
the WTO to create open energy markets, establish protections for 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), encourage energy efficiency, and 
establish energy transit protocols amongst its 54 signatories.145 To-
day’s version of the ECT, initially signed into force in 2015, has 86 
signatory countries, in addition to the European Union (E.U.), the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC/Euratom), and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).146 
i. The Vattenfall Controversies: Vattenfall I & II
In 2004, Swedish company Vattenfall purchased HEW, an elec-
tricity provider located in Hamburg, Germany, and made plans to 
replace the existing coal power plant with a larger power plant.147 In 
2006, the United Nations released a report, known as the Stern Re-
view, on the Economics of Climate Change.148 The report was 
named after Nicholas Stern, a former World Bank chief economist 
who led the research efforts.149 This report forecasted a global eco-
nomic crisis unless climate change was effectively curtailed.150 
Meanwhile, when this 700-page report was released, Vattenfall had 
already filed applications required by existing regulations for the 
new plant 
 144 The Energy Charter Treaty, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, https://energychar-
ter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/1994_ECT.pdf ; Energy Efficiency 
Group, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, https://energycharter.org/who-we-are/subsidi-
ary-bodies/energy-efficiency-group/. 
 145 The Energy Charter Treaty, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.ener-
gycharter.org/process/european-energy-charter-1991/ 
 146 Overview: The International Energy Charter, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, 
[hereinafter ECT Overview]. http://www.energycharter.org/process/interna-
tional-energy-charter-2015/overview/ 
 147 Sebastian Knauer, Power Plant Battle Goes to International Arbitration, 
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to comply with air and water pollution standards.151 While the im-
pression at the time was that Vattenfall was well underway to ob-
taining its permits, the climate report had a significant political im-
pact and environmental groups were protesting the continued use of 
coal.152 Politicians were declaring that there were plenty of available 
measures to stop the power plant’s construction, if they were 
elected.153 
Vattenfall was asked to make improvements to its plans and use 
the latest technologies to protect the new environmental objectives 
to avoid ecological harms to the local river, the Elbe, by using less 
water for cooling.154 Finding these requests burdensome and costly, 
it pursued negotiations with agencies, and an administrative judg-
ment to avoid the constantly changing requirements and costs.155 
Even though the Administrative court granted Vattenfall the per-
mits, it stipulated a significant number of changes.156 Vattenfall 
argued the changes were uneconomical and would result in a signif-
icant loss in value.157 It argued that any ecological benefits of re-
duced water usage would reduce output and productivity; thus, it 
would be contesting the decisions and seeking $1.4 billion in dam-
ages through international arbitration under the ECT.158 
In 2009, despite retaining counsel and placing its required Plain-
tiff’s fee of $25,000 into a trust account in New York to begin the 
arbitration, Vattenfall announced it would be opening a power plant 
with a €200 million high tech hybrid cooling tower that would use 
one-tenth of the amount of water from the river.159 However, Vat-
tenfall did not file any applications and appeared to be waiting 
for the resolution of the arbitration before doing so.160 On March 
11, 2011, the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes released a certified copy of an award indicating that 
Vattenfall and 
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Germany settled their case, presumably for an undisclosed 
amount.161 
On that same day, March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake 
struck the Pacific Coast of Japan, with its epicenter in the northeast-
ern Tōhoku region.162 It is one of the strongest recorded earthquakes 
in history and the strongest earthquake that has ever hit Japan.163 
The tsunami that followed caused an unprecedented loss of human 
life and physical devastation in its wake, including the disruption of 
eleven nuclear reactors, and the nuclear meltdowns and hydrogen 
explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.164 
Germany has a decades-long history of public debate around nu-
clear energy, with consistent opposition to expansion of nuclear 
power, and Fukushima pushed it over the tipping point.165 Immedi-
ately following the disaster, an estimated 110,000 Germans took to 
the streets to protest against the expansion of nuclear power in Ger-
many.166 Just days after the Fukushima earthquake, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel announced the permanent closure of seven of 
the country’s seventeen nuclear reactors, focusing on the country’s 
oldest reactors.167 She also announced plans to “accelerate the en-
ergy conversation” on Germany’s shift to renewable energy sources, 
or Energiewende.168 By the end of March, Germany witnessed its 
largest recorded anti-nuclear demonstration, which was organized 
161 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG, 
v. Fed. Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/06,Award, (March 11,
2011). [hereinafter Vattenfall (I) Award] 
 162 2011 Japan Earthquake- Tsunami Fast Facts, CNN News (Updated March 




165 Paul Hockenos, “Why Germans are so skeptical about nuclear energy,” 
WORLD POLICY, (May 10, 2012) https://worldpolicy.org/2012/05/10/why-ger-
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around the slogan, “heed Fukushima—shut off all nuclear power 
plants.”169 Within a few months, legislation passed to officially 
phase out nuclear power plants from the country by 2022.170 
Soon after the legislation was enacted, several nuclear power 
plant operators announced their intentions to contest the law.171 Two 
of the oldest nuclear reactor facilities were owned and operated by 
Vattenfall.172 The Vattenfall CEO at the time claimed that an imme-
diate shutdown would cost the company $1.5 billion in 2011 reve-
nue alone.173 
On May 31 2012, the Swedish energy company, relying on its 
rights as a foreign investor, registered another claim at the ICSID 
against the German government under the ECT.174 Like the recent 
TransCanada case against the United States, Vattenfall covered all 
its bases and also filed a lawsuit before Germany’s Federal Consti-
tutional Court.175 
ii. Analysis of Vattenfall I & II under the ECT
Unlike other bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, the 
ECT does not require investors to first exhaust national or E.U. 
legal remedies before pursuing ISDS.176 The ECT also does not 
prevent investors from pursuing both methods concurrently, or 
to try the other forum if the first is unsuccessful.177 While ICSID 
rules do not require that proceedings remain confidential, the 
proceedings of 
 169 MARK FULTON ET AL., THE 2011 INFLECTION POINT FOR ENERGY 
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both Vattenfall cases are unavailable for review,178 so an examina-
tion of procedural orders and public filings can be used for analysis. 
Vattenfall filed its first complaint against the German federation 
claiming that the provisions set out in Part 3 of the ECT for the pro-
tection and promotion of investments were violated by requiring the 
environmental permits.179 Article 10(1) of the ECT requires con-
tracting parties to “encourage and create stable, equitable and trans-
parent conditions for investors of other contracting parties.”180 Like-
wise, Article 13 of the ECT establishes that investments may not be 
nationalized, expropriated, or subjected to “an action equivalent to 
nationalisation or expropriation” without compensation.181 
In the second Vattenfall case, Germany first objected to the tri-
bunal jurisdiction and merits of the case under ICSID’s Arbitration 
Rule 41(5).182 Under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5), a party may file 
an objection against a claim that is “manifestly without merit.”183 
While this rule allows an early conclusion to the arbitration process, 
this is only appropriate where the claim is without merit on its 
face.184 The proceedings continued,185 indicating that the tribunal 
found there was at least possible controversy on the face of the com-
plaint. Vattenfall’s arguments most likely rest upon the argument 
that environmental regulations constitute indirect expropriation and 
that it had a legitimate expectation to be free of arbitrary measures, 
as there was no direct expropriation of property when Germany 
passed the regulations. In cases of indirect expropriation, the inves-
tor retains its property but is so adversely affected by regulatory 
 178 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Background paper on Vattenfall v. Ger-
many arbitration, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
(July 2009) 4. 
 179 Request for Arbitration, Vattenfall AB,Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall 
Europe Generation AG, v. Fed. Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/06, (March 30 2009), [hereinafter Vattenfall (I) Request for Arbitration] 
¶ 69, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0889.pdf 
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measures that it amounts to losing the benefit of the property 
rights.186 
Just as in the dispute between the United States and TransCan-
ada under NAFTA, the resolution of the dispute between Vattenfall 
and Germany can only be speculation at this point, due to the confi-
dential nature of the proceedings. Unlike the Keystone dispute, how-
ever, there is likely to be a resolution as none of the causes of the 
dispute will change in the foreseeable future. 
C. The 1988 Switzerland – Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty 
The controversy between Philip Morris and Uruguay is of par-
ticular interest because, unlike the Keystone XL and Vattenfall 
cases, this dispute has already been resolved, with a significantly 
larger amount of procedural documents available for public exami-
nation. 
Signed in 1988,187 the bilateral investment treaty between Swit-
zerland and Uruguay establishes fairly conventional rules for trade 
between the two countries. The BIT provides the standard provi-
sions found in modern bilateral agreements; a provision for fair 
and equitable treatment, one for most favored nation treatment, 
one against expropriation, exceptions for public policy 
considerations and of course provisions for ISDS. 
i. Philip Morris v. Uruguay
Philip Morris International is multinational cigarette and to-
bacco company with products sold in 180 countries— its best-sell-
ing and most recognized product is Marlboro cigarettes.188 Its cor-
porate headquarters are in New York and its operational headquar-
ters are in Lausanne, Switzerland.189 In the early 20th Century to-
 186 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, “Indirect Expro-
priation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, Septem-
ber 2004, OECD, 2-4 (2004). 
 187 Switzerland-Uruguay Bilateral Investmnt Treaty, Available at http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3121 
188 PHILIP MORRIS INT’L, https://www.pmi.com. 
 189 Company Info., PHILIP MORRIS INT’L, https://www.pmi.com/company-in-
formation. 
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bacco smoking was extremely common and even supported by med-
ical academia.190 In fact, during the 1930s, the companies’ tobacco 
advertisements were a steady source of income for numerous medi-
cal organizations and journals, including the New England Journal 
of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion.191 However, as more research and evidence emerged showing 
the negative health impacts of smoking, physicians and the public 
began to quit smoking and consuming tobacco.192 Tobacco compa-
nies responded with advertisements implying health benefits of 
smoking such as weight loss,193 and severely tarnished their 
credi-bility.194 Philip Morris now runs a health information web 
site out-lining the health issues of tobacco.195 However, it has been 
criticized as a “public relations effort intended to help the company 
avoid pun-ishment and regulation.”196 Because tobacco is 
considered “the sin-gle greatest cost of preventative death 
globally,”197 Philip Morris and its competitors are increasingly 
seen as controversial companies and subject to restrictive 
legislation from governments and ongoing campaigns warning the 
public of health impacts.198 
 190 Martha N. Gardner & Allan M. Brandt, “The Doctors’ Choice is America’s 
Choice,” The Physician in US Cigarette Advertisements, 1930-1953, 96 AM. J. 
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Globally, tobacco consumption kills approximately 5.1 million 
people per year199 and, according to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), is responsible for nearly 12% of all deaths for adults over 
30 years old.200 In 2003, at the 56th annual World Health Assembly, 
member states signed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol (FCTC). 201 The FCTC entered into force in 2005 with 180 par-
ties.202 The legally binding treaty committed all member states to 
implement country-level tobacco control measures to combat the 
negative public health effects of tobacco consumption.203 
Uruguay was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the 
treaty.204 Though Uruguay had enacted legislation in 1982 to restrict 
tobacco advertisements to minors and to print text warnings on 
boxes, those efforts were not as successful as they could have 
been.205 At the time FCTC was ratified, both in Uruguay and in the 
rest of the Southern regions of Latin America, smoking was a so-
cially accepted behavior and public awareness regarding the risks of 
tobacco use was low, while the smoking prevalence rate was 33.3%. 
206
In 2006, former oncologist and President of Uruguay Tabaré 
Vàsquez made a speech outlining his vision to make Uruguay a 
“smoke free” country.207 That year, Uruguay banned smoking in 
public spaces, raised taxes on tobacco products, and required large 
 199 WHO GLOBAL REPORT: MORTALITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO TOBACCO, World 
Health Org. (2012). Available at: http://www.who.int/tobacco/publications/sur-
veillance/rep_mortality_attributable/en/. 
 200 Philip Morris Brands SARL, Philip Morris Products S.A, & Abal Her-
manos S.A., v. Oriental Repubic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7Arbitral 
Award, (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay Award]. 
 201 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 42 
I.L.M. 518 (2003) [hereinafter WHO FCTC] 
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203 Id. 
204 Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay Award, supra note 201 ¶ 85. 
205 Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by Pan American Health Org., Philip Mor-
ris Brands SARL, Philip Morris Products S.A, & Abal Hermanos S.A., v. Oriental 
Repubic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 [hereinafter PAHO Amicus 
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warnings and graphic images including diseased lungs and rotting 
teeth on cigarette packages.208 In 2008 and 2009, additional laws and 
regulations were introduced, with implementation methods such as 
increasing fines for non-compliance, banning promotion of ‘light’ 
or ‘mild’ cigarettes, and requiring health warnings take up 80% of 
all tobacco packaging.209 Philip Morris challenged the regulations in 
Uruguayan courts, arguing that they violated several provisions in 
the BIT between Switzerland and Uruguay, including its intellectual 
property rights.210 In February 2010, Philip Morris filed a complaint 
against Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT seeking $25 
million in damages.211 
The complaint was not received well by the international com-
munity, and a variety of Amicus briefs and supporting documents 
came in from several organizations.212 In an expert opinion analyz-
ing tobacco control measures in the context of international invest-
ment laws, Todd Weiler noted that the arbitration move was a delib-
erate political statement with its claim under the BIT.213 In particu-
lar, Weiler made note that Uruguay has a fairly small population size 
of 3.4 million and that Philip Morris had structured its holding com-
panies in Switzerland.214 He argued that if Philip Morris were to pre-
vail in its claim against Uruguay, it would be nearly certain that “its 
choice of Switzerland as a corporate base indicates that more claims 
against other developing nations could follow.”215 
208 Id at 4. 
209 Id. 
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ii. Analysis of the Philip Morris Controversy under the BIT
In its claim, Philip Morris asserted that Uruguay violated Arti-
cles 3(1), 3(2), 5, and 11, of the BIT.216 Article 3 (1) of the Switzer-
land-Uruguay BIT contains a treaty standard that prohibits the host 
government from imposing “unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures” that impair enjoyment, use, sale, and liquidation, among 
other things, of foreign investments made in its territory.217 Under 
Article 3 (2) of the treaty, investors are entitled to a MFN treatment 
afforded to other foreign investors218. Additionally, like all BITs, the 
Switzerland-Uruguay BIT has a FET standard, specifically con-
tained in Article 3 (2) of the treaty.219 Article 9 mandates that a dis-
pute be submitted to the host government’s courts for resolution 
over a period of 18 months, meaning that disputes are not to be re-
moved to an international forum until the host government has been 
accorded an opportunity to resolve the controversy. 220Article 5 pre-
vents expropriation, nationalization, or any other measure “with 
similar effect” unless the host government’s measures “are taken in 
for the public benefit, on a non-discriminatory basis, under due pro-
cess of law . . . “221 
Philip Morris’s claim against Uruguay was particularly weak. 
Philip Morris had rushed into initiating arbitration proceedings be-
fore the 18-month period required by Article 10.222 While there was 
a possibility that Uruguay could have had the case dismissed for 
failing to meet the required 18-month period of domestic proceed-
ings, the tribunal found that by the time the arbitral proceedings had 
begun the requisite 18-month period had been satisfied.223  If the 
tribunal had not declared that the 18-month period was satisfied, 
216 Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay Award, supra note 201 at ¶175. 
 217 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay 
On the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments [hereinafter Switzer-
land - Uruguay BIT] (Oct. 7, 1988), art. 3 § 1 
218 Switzerland - Uruguay BIT art. 3 §2 
219 Id. 
220 Switzerland - Uruguay BIT, art. 9 § 2; Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay 
Award supra note 201 ¶ 503 
 221 Switzerland – Uruguay BIT at art. 5; Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay Award 
supra note 201 ¶182. 
222 Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay Award, supra note 201 ¶ 25. 
223 Id at ¶ 581 
2018] IS PUBLIC POLICY UNDERMINED BY INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE 
MECHANISMS 165
Philip Morris could have tried another method. It could have at-
tempted to get around this requirement by using the Most Favored 
Nation clauses to reach any other BIT Uruguay may have that does 
not have an 18-month rule. The successfulness of maneuvers like 
this is questionable but has worked in other arbitral proceedings so 
its potential efficacy in this situation remains unexplored. 
Philip Morris’s claim was based on the concept of de facto ap-
propriation under Article 5 of the BIT—an expropriation of the 
value of its intangible future profits, foreclosed via the ban on lines 
of cigarette brands labeled in a misleading manner such as ‘light’.224 
An analysis under Article 5 of the BIT would require an action of 
expropriation as a matter of law. The text reads: 
(1) Neither of the Contracting Parties shall take, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, measures of expropriation, 
nationalization or any other measure having the same 
nature or the same effect against investments belong-
ing to investors of the other Contracting Party, unless 
the measures are taken for the public benefit as es-
tablished by law, on a non-discriminatory basis, and 
under due process of law, and provided that provi-
sions be made for effective and adequate compensa-
tion. The amount of compensation, interest included, 
shall be settled in the currency of the country of 
origin of the investment and paid without delay to the 
person entitled thereto.225 
Under a literal construction of the FET standard, Philip Morris 
argued that the FET provisions require a tribunal to review Uru-
guay’s laws on a standard of objective fairness and equity, with little 
deference to the right of a sovereign to set public policy in the public 
interest.226 However, any claim about inherent substantive fairness 
or equity of a state’s action needs to be supported by evidence of 
manifestly unfair conduct that could not be rationally supported by 
a legitimate non-discriminatory policy goal for that “treatment” of 
224 Id at ¶¶ 183-87 
225 Switzerland – Uruguay BIT at art. 5 § 1 
226 Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay Award, supra note 201 at ¶309 
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an investor to successfully rise to the level of a breach of a FET 
standard.227 
Empirical evidence from other countries supports that advertis-
ing regulations are an effective method of reducing tobacco con-
sumption and have a net benefit to public health.228 Philip Morris 
would have to demonstrate that this type of advertising regulation 
only shifts the tobacco market, and creates an unfair burden to it 
alone. In fact, that Philip Morris brought a claim against Uruguay at 
all indicates it is concerned by the efficacy of these regulations. The 
burden to demonstrate arbitrary and patently unfair regulatory adop-
tions or effects in this example is extremely high, and made it im-
probable that Philip Morris could succeed with this line of argumen-
tation. With the burden already quite high under the broadest inter-
pretation, it is not surprising that Philip Morris was unsuccessful 
when the tribunal took the more narrow approach. 
In addition to the improbability of being able to meet this bur-
den, Philip Morris did not properly weigh the influence of the 
FCTC. Article 7 of the FCTC is a self-executing obligation and man-
dates parties to adopt and implement their obligations under Articles 
8 through 13.229 Article 11 of the FCTC requires regulation for pack-
aging and labeling tobacco products and grants parties to exceed the 
mandates within it.230 The tribunal found that meeting these obliga-
tions was fully within the rights and responsibilities of the govern-
ment of Uruguay.231 
The general consensus was that not only was this a great victory 
for Uruguay and the concept of national sovereignty, but it was also 
a signal that commercial rights only go so far.232 When addressing 
the victory in a televised address to the people of Uruguay, President 
Tabaré Vásquez said, “It is not acceptable to prioritize commercial 
227 Id at ¶¶311-12, 317, 320 
228 WHO Amicus Brief, supra note 213 at ¶¶ 23-40 
229 See WHO FCTC, supra note 202. 
230 Id at art. 11. 
231 Philip Morris Int’l v. Uruguay Award supra note 201 at ¶305-07 
232 See e.g.,Malena Castaldi, Anthony Esposito, “Phillip Morris loses tough-
on-tobacco lawsuit in Uruguay” REUTERS, (Jul. 8 2016) https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-pmi-uruguay-lawsuit-idUSKCN0ZO2LZ; 
Laurent Huber, “Uruguay’s Victory Over Philip Morris Will Change The World” 
The Blog, HUFFINGTON POST, (Jul 19, 2016) https://www.huffing-
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considerations over the fundamental right to health and life.”233 Af-
ter its victory in the case, Uruguay declared that as of 2017 cigarettes 
in Uruguay would be sold in generic packaging.234 
IV. A GROWING MOVEMENT AGAINST GLOBALIZATION AND FREE
TRADE 
A. Reversing the liberalization of Trade 
The TPP was a multilateral treaty negotiated between 12 coun-
tries to create a trade bloc between the Americas and the Pacific 
Rim.235 For the United States, it was a strategic foreign policy pivot 
towards Asia to serve as a counterbalance to China’s strong influ-
ence on the region.236 Most of the countries involved in negotiations 
already had bilateral trade agreements or smaller multilateral agree-
ments with other members.237 This meant that despite the potential 
to become the largest multilateral trading bloc in history, as a newer 
multilateral agreement, many were skeptical of whether the TPP 
could provide a considerable increase in access to markets. 238 There 
were also doubts that the TTP would provide significantly measur-
able economic gains for any country other than the United States, at 
the same time that others questioned the benefits to the United 
States.239 While the text was based on established models of bilateral 
and multilateral treaties from the United States,240 it did not help that 
the parties to the TPP agreed not to release any text of the treaty until 
after it was signed by the governments and not to release draft ne-
gotiating texts until four years after the signing.241 
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The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
launched a website providing information addressing the most com-
mon and contentious concerns around the trade agreement, to ease 
the public’s growing fears.242 In the section addressing ISDS, USTR 
made arguments expounding on the benefits of ISDS to American 
companies, and listed new safeguards proposed to improve ISDS 
including public participation and increased transparency.243 Other 
TPP countries, such as Australia, pushed non-economic advantages 
in is public marketing of the trade deal.244  Nevertheless, thousands 
of citizens from TPP countries signed petitions and lead protests 
against secret negotiations, and a strong opposition to the trade 
agreement gained momentum, and delayed negotiations.245 In addi-
tion to concern about provisions on intellectual property, human 
rights, and environmental issues, there was significant public con-
cern about ISDS provisions.246 
Leading up to the 2016 United States presidential election, op-
position to the treaty became so strong that most candidates de-
nounced the TPP in primaries, with the final Democratic and Re-
publican candidates running platforms against the trade deal.247  Af-
ter winning the presidential election and taking office, the first ac-
tion President Donald Trump took was to formally withdraw from 
the TPP.248 While public opposition had grown to the point that Con-
gress refused to move forward on the agreement, the executive order 
for immediate withdrawal was a symbolic message that the new ad-
ministration went beyond resisting liberal free-trade ideology to its 
complete rejection.249 
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TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, www.USTR.gov/tpp. 
 243 USTR, Upgrading and Improving Investor State Dispute Settlement Fact 
Sheet, THE TRANS PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, www.USTR.gov/tpp. 
244 Ranald, supra note 1, at 244. 
245 Id.at 253-54. 
246 Id. 
247 William Mauldin, Donald Trump Withdraws U.S. From Trans-Pacific 




249 Id.; Bowman at 81. 
2018] IS PUBLIC POLICY UNDERMINED BY INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE 
MECHANISMS 169
Likewise, the Trans-Atlantic Trade Investment Partnership 
Agreement (TTIP) between the United States and the E.U. faced 
public opposition and debate because drafts proposed including 
ISDS provisions.250 By 2014, the European Commission decided to 
pause negotiations in response to public concern.251 In addition to 
the traditional fears of job and economic losses under free-trade, Eu-
ropean citizens in particular expressed fears that the ISDS provi-
sions in the TTIP would allow the world’s largest corporations to 
force nations to roll back public health, banking, or food and envi-
ronmental safety measures.252 
Another sign of the changing tide against free-trade is the in-
creasing number of countries that are now opting to renegotiate or 
terminate trade treaties in critical response to ISDS processes.253For 
example, after finding the ISDS provisions unconstitutional for 
serving as a “waiver of sovereign jurisdiction,” Ecuador started the 
process to terminate its bilateral agreements with the United States, 
Argentina, Canada, Chile, China, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela and the United King-
dom.254 Due to the sunset provisions in its agreements, investments 
in Ecuador remain protected for ten years after withdrawal, but with-
out the ability to bring arbitral claims against Ecuador, which offi-
cially withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2009.255 Similarly, 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela also withdrew from the ICSID 
Convention.256 
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251 Id. 
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In similar actions, Indonesia withdrew from more than 60 bilat-
eral investment treaties in 2014.257 In 2016, India initiated renegoti-
ation for 47 investment treaties requiring that foreign investors ex-
haust all domestic legal remedies before pursuing ISDS.258 Italy an-
nounced its withdrawal from the ECT in 2015 with a sunset period 
of one year.259 
B. Proposed Alternatives to ISDS 
In response to the considerable backlash to ISDS, a number of 
other changes are already under way to salvage the benefits of free 
trade while protecting sovereign states from the negative effects of 
ISDS. Generally speaking, successful recommendations and at-
tempts at international investment agreement reform require a two-
pronged approach.260 First, existing treaties and treaty models must 
be renegotiated and modernized to provide transparency and further 
safeguards.261 Second, entirely new treaty models should be formu-
lated and explored.262 Nearly 110 countries have reviewed and 
changed their national or international investment policies or 
both.263 There has also been a significant shift in the drafting 
prac-tices at the bilateral level to take steps preserving a nation’s 
right to 
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regulate or pass laws otherwise conducive to successful sustainable 
development.264 Treaties on the multilateral treaty level that are un-
der negotiation include more provisions for transparency in ISDS. 
For example, the general body of UNCITRAL drafted a Convention 
increasing Transparency in Treaty Based Investor-State Arbitra-
tion.265 Other ideas include the creation of a supra-national body or 
court to resolve disputes. 
Take the case of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA). The public backlash in response to the disclo-
sure that the TTIP would include ISDS sparked a proposal for a per-
manent Investment Court System to replace ISDS mechanisms in all 
E.U. bilateral trade agreements. During the final stages of legal re-
vision, in February 2016, in the bilateral trade agreement between 
Canada and the E.U., CETA began including amendments to include 
the ICS. CETA is the first significant free trade agreement to replace 
the ISDS systems with the new ICS.266Because protecting investors 
is important to the global community at large, the E.U. and Canada 
are working create a process likely to be accepted multilater-
ally.267 The concept of the ICS was developed with a 12-week 
public comment period and meetings with stakeholder groups. 268 
Major improvements the ICS would provide would be that it would 
be pub-
 264 See e.g., Mark Weaver, The Proposed Transatlantic Trade And Investment 
Partnership (Ttip): Isds Provisions, Reconciliation, And Future Trade Implica-
tions, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225 (2014); Edward Guntrip, Self-Determination 
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lic, with professional and independent judges and work transpar-
ently.269 CETA’s proposal also includes reforms such as a code of 
conduct, an appellate mechanism and banning frivolous claims.270 
V. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ISDS AND FREE-TRADE 
While the concept of a multilateral investment court may sound 
like an inevitable resolution to the ISDS dilemma, it is still under 
development. Stakeholders beyond investors, business organiza-
tions, and public authorities need to be included in the negotiations, 
such as trade unions, academic scholars, and the arbitrator commu-
nity. A multilateral investment court also paradoxically brings state 
sovereignty into question while trying to protect it, by needing bind-
ing international agreement to submit to its jurisdiction. However, 
without changes to the current model of ISDS mechanisms the 
growing concerns against corporate rights and priorities overtaking 
a nation’s ability to set policy and prioritize the needs of citizens. 
Without reforms to ISDS, the future of free trade is at risk. For 
countries to continue to benefit from the free flow of trade (and in 
the case of the European Union, labor) trade agreements need to 
provide a method for investors to confidently protect their assets in 
other countries. Transparency and public participation may be the 
most simple and efficient way to preserve the gains made in the 
global economy, while making the ISDS process more palatable. 
ISDS cases with much more transparency, such as the Philip-Morris 
v. Uruguay dispute, provide insight into the decision-making pro-
cess and make the arbitration easier to understand and hopefully less 
frightening to the broader public. The public availability of amicus 
briefs and the legal reasoning behind the arbitral award take away 
the mystery and contribute to a growing body of jurisprudence for 
lawmakers, investors and arbitrators to look to before making in-
vestments, passing laws, or even signing onto treaties. 
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